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Abstract
Over the past 20 years, the efficiency of secure multi-party protocols has been greatly improved.
While the seminal protocols from the late 80’s require a communication of Ω(n6) field elements
per multiplication among n parties, recent protocols offer linear communication complexity. This
means that each party needs to communicate a constant number of field elements per multiplication,
independent of n.
However, these efficient protocols only offer active security, which implies that at most t < n/3
(perfect security), respectively t < n/2 (statistical or computational security) parties may be
corrupted. Higher corruption thresholds (i.e., t ≥ n/2) can only be achieved with degraded security
(unfair abort), where one single corrupted party can prevent honest parties from learning their
outputs.
The aforementioned upper bounds (t < n/3 and t < n/2) have been circumvented by considering
mixed adversaries (Fitzi et al., Crypto’ 98), i.e., adversaries that corrupt, at the same time, some
parties actively, some parties passively, and some parties in the fail-stop manner. It is possible, for
example, to achieve perfect security even if 2/3 of the parties are faulty (three quarters of which
may abort in the middle of the protocol, and a quarter may even arbitrarily misbehave). This
setting is much better suited to many applications, where the crash of a party is more likely than a
coordinated active attack.
Surprisingly, since the presentation of the feasibility result for the mixed setting, no progress
has been made in terms of efficiency: the state-of-the-art protocol still requires a communication of
Ω(n6) field elements per multiplication.
In this paper, we present a perfectly-secure MPC protocol for the mixed setting with essentially
the same efficiency as the best MPC protocols for the active-only setting. For the first time, this
allows to tolerate faulty majorities, while still providing optimal efficiency. As a special case, this also
results in the first fully-secure MPC protocol secure against any number of crashing parties, with
optimal (i.e., linear in n) communication. We provide simulation-based proofs of our construction.
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1 Introduction
In this work, we consider the problem of secure multi-party computation (MPC), where n
mutually distrusted parties want to jointly perform some computation, represented by a
circuit over a finite field, with input, output, multiplication, affine and randomness gates. We
assume that each pair of parties is connected by a secure channel and that the communication
is synchronous.
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Intuitively, a protocol executed by the parties is secure if it is “as good as” an ideal
trusted third party who performs the computation for the parties. This is formalized in the
so-called real-world/ideal-world paradigm by requiring that anything an adversary can do in
the real-world protocol execution can also be achieved in the ideal world with the trusted
party. In this work, we focus on perfect security against a central, static adversary, who can
corrupt up to t parties of its choice.
Corruption Types
In the literature, several types of corruption are considered, in particular, active, passive (also
called semi-honest) and fail-stop corruption1. Since the seminal works [9, 15], it is known
that a perfectly-secure protocol can only tolerate t < n/3 active corruptions, or t < n/2
passive corruptions.2 We note that one can tolerate t < n active corruptions, at the cost of
degrading security (i.e., give up on guaranteed output delivery), but in this work we focus
on full security.
Fitzi et al. [26] pointed out a trade-off between the adversary’s capabilities and the overall
number of corruptions. For example, considering passive adversaries has the advantage of
being able to tolerate as many as t < n/2 corruptions (in the fail-stop setting this is even
t < n). However, these weak corruption types are not practical – if a single party misbehaves,
protocols for such settings give no security guarantees at all. On the other hand, considering
only active corruptions may be too pessimistic, since it comes at the cost of lowering the
threshold to n/3. [26] showed that there is room in between the above “pure” settings and
introduced the mixed-adversary setting, in which the adversary can simultaneously corrupt
up to ta parties actively, up to tp parties passively, and up to tf parties in a fail-stop manner.3
Perfectly secure MPC in the mixed setting is possible if and only if 3ta + 2tp + tf < n.
The mixed setting strictly generalizes the pure settings and, in addition, offers flexibility,
since it allows to trade off a few corruptions of a strong type for many corruptions of a weaker
type. For example, decreasing ta by one allows to tolerate three more fail-stop corruptions.
A protocol for the mixed setting can tolerate, for example, n/2 fail-stop corrupted parties, in
addition to slightly less than 1/6 actively corrupted parties (which gives dishonest majority).
Communication-Efficient MPC
The first protocols proving that MPC is possible in the pure settings [9, 15] and in the mixed
setting [26] were quite inefficient, with communication costs of evaluating one multiplication
gate as high as Ω(n6) field elements. Since then, great improvements have been achieved in
the pure settings [19, 38, 22, 8, 10, 29, 33], leading to protocols with complexity linear in n.
However, for the (from a practical viewpoint) more relevant mixed setting, no practically
efficient protocols are known. Providing such protocols would immediately yield efficient
solutions for all pure settings, and, additionally, all settings “in between”.
1 Here the adversary is only allowed to crash parties, and it does not learn their internal states. Sometimes
this setting is relaxed by making the sending operation atomic – a party can only crash after sending
all messages in a given round. Since this seems unrealistic, we do not consider this relaxation.
2 It is also possible to achieve higher thresholds, for example t < n/2 active corruptions, if one considers
additional assumptions (such as a broadcast channel). In this paper we do not consider these settings.
3 We stress that a fail-corrupted party can be simultaneously passively-corrupted, in which case it colludes
with other corrupted parties.
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1.1 Contributions
We present the first multi-party computation protocol with perfect security against mixed
adversaries, and with the communication cost of computing one multiplication gate linear in
the number of parties. We achieve the optimal resiliency of 3ta + 2tp + tf < n. Moreover, we
provide simulation-based proofs of security of our constructions.
This immediately yields, as special cases, protocols with optimal communication complex-
ity for all pure settings. In particular, we get a protocol that tolerates tf < n fail-corruptions,
a realistic setting that has so far received surprisingly little attention in the MPC literature.
Moreover, our result covers all settings in between, for instance, one with many fail-corruptions
and few active corruptions, as long as tf + 3ta < n. We believe that considering such settings
makes sense, since in many applications it may be more likely that a party crashes, rather
than that it engages in a malicious, coordinated attack.
Perhaps surprisingly, many techniques used in the settings with only active or only passive
corruptions fail in the setting with additional fail-corruptions. We briefly summarize a couple
of problems:
The efficient secret reconstruction protocol of [22] requires the number of correct parties
(that is, neither actively nor fail-corrupted) to be in Ω(n). Intuitively, in order to
reconstruct k sharings, these are expanded to n sharings (using an error-correcting code).
These n sharings are then reconstructed (robustly), one sharing to one party, who then
forwards the secret to all other parties. The error-correcting code allows to correct faults
introduced by corrupted parties. In the active-only setting, error correction is possible
as long as k ≤ n− 2ta, so one can reconstruct k = n/3 sharings at costs O(n2). In the
mixed setting, error-correction (with erasures) requires k ≤ n− 2ta − tf , which might be
as small as 1. So the quadratic costs cannot be amortized. To deal with this problem, we
develop a more efficient, but non-robust, version of the protocol from [22], and employ an
extended version of the player-elimination framework to make it robust.
A standard technique for evaluating an input gate is to reconstruct an existing sharing of a
random value towards the inputting party, who then broadcast the difference to its input.
This approach breaks down in the mixed setting, if the inputting party crashes. This
is because known broadcast protocols for the mixed setting [27] provide no guarantees
for a corrupted sender, so the received value can be arbitrary (even if the sender is only
fail-corrupted). In fact, a rushing adversary may even be able to change the sender’s
input to a related value.4
We introduce a simple generic technique to deal with such situations – We execute the
standard broadcast protocol that guarantees correctness only if the sender does not crash,
and afterwards check if the party crashed, by executing a special heartbeat protocol. If
so, its input is set to a default value (note that allowing this is unavoidable, e.g. if the
party crashes before sending any messages).
Hyper-invertible matrices [8] are used to generate big bunches of sharings of random values.
Every party shares one input to the matrix. Then the parties verify the consistency of all
outputs by reconstructing and verifying ta of them. In the active setting, this is achieved
by reconstructing 2ta sharings (each to a different party). In the mixed setting one would
need to reconstruct 2ta + tf sharings. This destroys the efficiency of the construction.
To deal with this, we use the same approach as above – we change the semantics of
4 Note that the fail-corrupted parties do not reveal their inputs, unless they are also passively or actively
corrupted.
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the protocol from [8] and give guarantees analogous to those of the broadcast protocol.
Specifically, correctness is guaranteed only if no party crashes. In case of crashes,
inconsistent outputs can go through undetected – this will be handled in the extended
player-elimination framework, using the heartbeat subroutine.
In the player-elimination framework [35], the actual computation is performed by a very
efficient, so-called “detectable” protocol, that does not guarantee correctness, but that
guarantees that an inconsistency is detected by a correct party. After the protocol,
the parties agree on whether any inconsistencies were detected. If so, they identify the
corrupted parties, eliminate them, and repeat the process. Several problems occur in the
mixed setting. First, since we modified the semantics of hyper-invertible matrices, in our
computation faults may not be observed by any correct party. Second, parties crashing
during the identification process cause additional headache. Finally, it is not known how
to identify a conflict between an honest and a corrupted party. In the active setting
(3ta < n), one can simply eliminate both of them, but in the mixed setting, eliminating
a crashed party with an honest party would violate the threshold (3ta + 2tp + tf < n).
We deal with all these problems with a simple and elegant trick: We use the (almost)
standard fault detection from [35]. In case of crashes, we might identify wrong parties.
So, once we know who should be eliminated, we check whether some party has crashed
and, if so, we eliminate it (alone). Otherwise, the parties were identified correctly and
can be eliminated.
We prove the security of our protocol in a simulation-based framework, which allows to
simplify and modularize the proof. That is, for most of our subprotocols we define an ideal
functionality and prove that it is realized by the construction. We can then use this idealized
functionality in the higher-level protocol, and the security of the overall construction follows
by the composition theorem. We note, however, that modularization of protocols executed
within the player-elimination framework is nontrivial. Roughly, idealizing a detectable
protocol makes it impossible to identify corrupted parties in case of a disruption (this
usually involves publicly replaying the disrupted execution, and hence depends on the actual
implementation of the protocol). Therefore, for some subprotocols, instead of defining ideal
functionalities, we only prove that they satisfy certain properties, which are then used in
further proofs.
1.2 Related Work
Communication-Efficient Active MPC
Since the seminal feasibility results [45, 32, 9, 15, 43, 5], the goal of reducing the communica-
tion complexity of actively-secure multi-party computation has received a lot of attention.
The considerable (although polynomial) complexity of the first protocols was reduced to
linear cost per multiplication gate in the cryptographic setting [19, 38], in the unconditional
setting (that is, allowing negligible error probability) [22, 20, 10, 29, 28], and in the setting
with perfect security [8, 33].
There also exist efficient protocols that can tolerate a dishonest majority [24, 21, 42, 4]
(where the online phase has linear complexity). We stress that such protocols can only offer
degraded security [17], in particular, no fairness or guaranteed output delivery. In this work,
we focus on full security.
On the negative side, it has been proved [23] that linear per-multiplication gate complexity
is inherent for unconditionally secure protocols.
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Communication Cost Independent of the Circuit Depth
Most protocols with linear communication complexity, including ours, communicate (over the
whole execution) additional O(D · p(n)) field elements, where D is the multiplicative depth
of the circuit5 and p is a small polynomial. This caveat was recently removed by Goyal et al.
[33], who construct a perfectly-secure protocol for the active setting with linear complexity
and no dependency on the circuit depth. We expect that our techniques can be applied to
the protocol of [33], resulting in a more efficient (for certain circuits) protocol for the mixed
setting. We leave proving this claim as an important open question.
Mixing Different Types of Corruptions
Protocols providing several guarantees, depending on the number and the type of corruptions,
have been proposed [14, 39, 40]. These papers consider adversaries that either corrupt a
number of parties passively, or corrupt a (smaller) number of parties actively. In contrast, in
the mixed setting, an adversary simultaneously corrupts some parties passively and some
actively.
The mixed setting was considered by Badrinarayanan et al. [3] in the context of round-
efficient protocols. The authors present a constant-round protocol for the cryptographic
setting, and assuming setup. They also give a simulation-based proof, in a model similar to
ours. We note that their scheme is not communication-efficient.
The mixed setting has also been studied in the context of secure message transmission
over an incomplete network [25, 16, 2], and in the context of degraded security [34].
Ghodosi and Pieprzyk [30] strengthen the mixed-adversary setting without fail-stop
corruptions (with tf = 0) to the setting with a so-called omnipresent adversary. The mixed
setting can also be generalized to deal with so-called general adversaries [7, 36] (we note that
these general protocols are very inefficient in the threshold setting).
1.3 Protocol Overview
Our protocol follows the preprocessing model – it consists of two phases: the preparation
(offline) phase, executed even before the inputs are specified, and the evaluation (online)
phase, executed once the circuit and the inputs are known.
We employ circuit randomization [6], which means that the goal of the preparation phase
is to generate a number of shared multiplication triples and sharings of random values. This
is done using hyper-invertible matrices [8], modified for the mixed setting. Then, in the
evaluation phase, the circuit is evaluated gate by gate: input gates are evaluated with the
help of existing sharings of random values, affine gates are evaluated locally using linearity of
the secret sharing, and a bunch of multiplication gates is evaluated simultaneously with the
help of multiplication triples (one per gate) and a new protocol for reconstructing a bunch of
secrets towards all parties (using a non-robust version of the protocol from [22]). Evaluating
an output gate corresponds to secret reconstruction.
Both phases employ the player-elimination framework [35], modified for the mixed setting,
where some parties are eliminated whenever the adversary disrupts the protocol. The
eliminated parties are excluded from further computation, with the exception of providing
5 The multiplicative depth of a circuit is the maximal number of multiplication gates on any path in the
circuit from an input or random gate to an output gate.
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inputs and receiving outputs. The preparation phase starts with the original party set, and
the evaluation phase continues with the set resulting from the preparation phase. (Note that
this is different than in [8], where only the preparation phase requires player elimination.)
The communication complexity of the preparation phase is O(
∣∣C∣∣nκ + n3κ), where∣∣C∣∣ is the size of the circuit. The communication complexity of the evaluation phase is
O(
∣∣C∣∣nκ+n3κ+Dn3κ+ cin2κ), where D is the multiplicative and ci is the number of input
gates.6
1.4 Outline of the Paper
Section 2 presents the stand-alone simulation-based model with mixed adversaries. Section 3
contains some essential preliminaries. Section 4 considers byzantine agreement protocols
needed in our setting. Section 5 extends the player-elimination framework to the mixed
setting. Section 6 treats Shamir secret sharing and various reconstruction protocols used
in this paper. Our main protocol is presented in Sections 7 (the preparation phase) and
8 (the evaluation phase). Finally, Section 9 contains conclusions and addresses universal
composition.
2 Model
We consider a set P = {P1, . . . , Pn} of n parties, who want to compute a function, represented
as a circuit over a finite field F with
∣∣F∣∣ ≥ 2n. The circuit contains ci input, co output, cm
multiplication, ca affine and cr random gates.
Mixed Adversaries
A mixed adversary can corrupt up to ta parties actively, up to tp parties passively, and up to
tf parties in a fail-stop manner. We denote by Pa,Pp and Pf the sets of actually corrupted
parties. The adversary gains full control over actively corrupted parties, and it sees the
whole internal state of passively corrupted parties. Moreover, at any point in the protocol,
it can make a fail-stop corrupted party crash. Once a party is crashed, it does not send
any messages. The adversary cannot see the inputs nor the messages processed by fail-stop
corrupted parties (unless they are simultaneously actively or passively corrupted). A party
which is not actively corrupted and has not crashed yet is called correct.
Stand-alone Security
We consider the standard stand-alone model of [12] with static adversary and synchronous
communication over perfectly-secure channels (for details of this model, see [31] or [12]). We
extend it to include mixed adversaries as follows. First, note that allowing multiple types
of corruption simultaneously is straightforward. Passive and active corruptions are already
modeled, so now we focus on fail corruptions.
Intuitively, we model fail corruptions as a very weak form of active corruptions, where
the adversary (1) does not see the secret state or the messages received by a fail-corrupted
party, and (2) only specifies the moment when such party stops sending messages in a given
6 One can easily get linear dependency on the number of input gates, using the techniques of [8]. However,
since the number of input gates is usually insignificant compared to the number of multiplication and
affine gates, we do not include this optimization in this paper.
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execution. Formally, the real-world execution starts with all fail-corrupted parties being
correct. Then, each round proceeds as follows. First, the correct parties generate their
messages, as in the protocol. The messages addressed to the actively- and passively-corrupted
parties, together with the randomness used by the latter, are given to the adversary. She then
specifies: (1) the messages sent by actively-corrupted parties, and (2) the set of fail-corrupted
parties that crash in this round. For each party Pi crashed in this round, the adversary
specifies a set of parties who still receive the message from Pi in this round. The crashed
parties are no longer considered correct in this execution. Finally, all parties receive their
messages.7 The view of a party consists of its input, randomness and all received messages.
The view of the adversary consists of the views of passively- and actively-corrupted parties.
In the ideal world, the ideal-world adversary (the simulator) interacts with the ideal
functionality F . As usual, he receives the inputs of passively-corrupted parties and modifies
the inputs of the actively-corrupted ones. Moreover, for fail-corrupted parties, he chooses
whether the input or a special symbol ⊥ should be given to F , where ⊥ means that the
party gives no input (note that this is inherent). In our model, fail-corrupted parties always
receive outputs (this strong guarantee is achieved by our protocols).
Formally, we consider functionalities F with domain (X ∪ {⊥})n, where ⊥ 6∈ X. The
semantic of ⊥ is left to the functionality, e.g., it can be replaced by a default value. The ideal
world is defined as follows: The parties that are not actively corrupted input values from X,
and the simulator receives the inputs of passively-corrupted parties. He then chooses the
inputs of actively-corrupted parties from X ∪ {⊥} and specifies a set D of fail-corrupted
parties whose inputs are set to ⊥. F is evaluated using the above inputs, and outputs are
sent to all parties.
The standard security requirement is that for every (unbounded) real-world adversary A,
there exists an ideal-world adversary S, such that the joint distribution of the view of A and
the outputs of the correct parties executing the protocol is equal to the joint distribution of
the output of S and the outputs of the correct parties computed by the ideal functionality F .
Modular Composition
The hybrid world with fail corruptions is the standard one (note that fail corruptions do
not affect ideal functionalities). Then, replacing ideal evaluation calls by subroutine calls is
straightforward: a subroutine is called with the set of actually crashed parties reset (note
that the set of fail-corrupted parties is constant). Observe that this means that crashed
parties may “come back to life” in subroutines. This is a strong type of corruption, and our
protocols are secure in this setting.8
Corruption-aware functionalities
The model of [12] was extended by Asharov and Lindell [1] to allow corruption-aware
functionalities, whose code depends on the corrupted set. We generalize this to the mixed
setting in the straightforward way. Specifically, our functionalities receive as inputs: (1)
the inputs from the parties, and (2) the sets Pa,Pp,Pf of corrupted parties. Then, each
functionality receives, upon initialization, the same set of parties actually controlled by the
7 In particular, this means that the crashed parties still receive their messages.
8 An alternative solution would be to enforce a consistent set of crashed parties. However, modeling this
would require techniques from the adaptive setting, such as the environment providing the crashed set.
Our solution is simpler and cleaner.
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adversary. Note that this is well defined in the static setting. We refer to [12] for a formal
description. Finally, we note that the corruption-aware functionalities were used in [1] only
as a tool to allow modular proofs. This is the same in our case. In particular, the final MPC
functionality both in this paper and in [1] is not corruption aware.
3 Preliminaries
We assume familiarity with hyper-invertible matrices and circuit randomization (we explain
these concepts in the full version [37]).
The Current Party Set
In this paper we execute protocols within the player-elimination framework, where some
parties are eliminated and the original party set P is reduced to a smaller set, which we
denote by P ′. Accordingly, we use t′a, t′p, t′f and n′ to denote the corruption thresholds in P ′
and |P ′|, respectively. A tuple (P ′, t′a, t′p, t′f ) is called a configuration.
The current configuration is an input to most of our protocols. Security is guaranteed
only if the inputted configuration is valid. Intuitively, we need that 3t′a + 2t′p + t′f < n′ holds
in P ′. However, since we use Shamir sharings with degree d = ta + tp (independent of P ′),
we also require that such sharings are possible to reconstruct by the parties in P ′. This
means that ta + tp < n′ − 2t′a − t′f , which implies 3t′a + 2t′p + t′f < n′.
I Definition 1. A configuration (P ′, t′a, t′p, t′f ) is valid if (1) P ′ ⊆ P, (2) ta+tp < n′−2t′a−t′f ,
and (3) |P ′ ∩ Px| ≤ t′x for all x ∈ {a, p, f}, where Px denotes the actually corrupted parties.
Complete Break Down
In some cases (which will never occur in the real execution) our functionalities provide no
security at all. This happens, for example, when the parties input inconsistent sets P ′. In
this case, we say that the functionality executes Complete Break Down, meaning that it
immediately stops execution, sends all inputs to the adversary and allows her to set all
outputs (see also [18]). Simulation is trivial in this case, and we omit this part in the code of
simulators.
Fixed Matrices
At different times in the protocols we use hyper-invertible and Vandermonde matrices. We
require that whenever in a protocol a matrix is chosen, all parties choose the same matrix.
So, for example, a fixed matrix of maximal needed size can be chosen as the parameter of
the protocol and the parties can use submatrices of appropriate sizes.
4 Byzantine Agreement
We consider two types of Byzantine-agreement protocols, namely consensus and broadcast.
A consensus protocol allows a set of parties, each holding an input xi, to reach agreement
on a common value y, where y = x if all correct parties have input xi = x. The guarantees
of consensus in the mixed setting were formalized by Garay and Perry [27]. They include
M. Hirt and M. Mularczyk 3:9
consistency – the outputs of all parties that are not actively corrupted are equal, and
persistence – if inputs of all correct parties are equal to x, then the outputs are equal to x.9
A broadcast protocol allows a sender to publicly announce his value to all parties, where
it is guaranteed that indeed all parties receive the same value. Broadcast can be trivially
constructed from consensus: the sender sends his value to every party and then parties
invoke consensus on the received values. Formally, in the mixed setting, we require the same
consistency as in consensus – the outputs of all parties that are not actively corrupted are
equal, and validity – if the sender stays correct until the end of the protocol and his input is
x, then all parties output x.
A consensus protocol for the setting with active and fail-stop corruptions (that is, for the
mixed setting with tp = 0) was given by Garay and Perry [27]. Their protocol achieves one-bit
consensus, assuming that 3ta + tf < n. As the protocol is perfectly secure, it is also secure in
the presence of (any number of) passively corrupted parties. The communication complexity
of the protocol in [27] is O(n3). However, by applying the king-simulation technique of [11],
this complexity can easily be reduced to O(n2).
When we execute protocols within the player-elimination framework, Byzantine agreement
is invoked among the parties in the reduced party set P ′, but all parties in P should learn the
output.10 Hence, we employ the following consensus protocol, where every party Pi ∈ P ′ has
input xi, and every party in P receives output. The protocol internally invokes a standard
consensus protocol, and it is secure assuming that 3t′a + 2t′p + t′f < n′.
1: The parties in P ′ invoke a standard consensus protocol (for example, [27, 11]), where the
input of Pi is xi.
2: Every party in P ′ sends the output to every party in P \ P ′.
3: Every party in P ′ outputs the result of the consensus, and every party in P \ P ′ determines
its output using the majority rule.
Protocol Consensus({xi}Pi∈P′)
Moreover, all parties in P should be able to act as a sender in broadcast.11 Such broadcast
can easily be constructed by having a sender Ps ∈ P send his value to all parties in P ′, who
then invoke Consensus on the received values.
The cost of Consensus instantiated with the protocol of [27, 11] is O(n2) (note that
n is the size of the initial set P). We denote by BA(κ) the complexity of broadcasting
or reaching consensus on a κ-bit message in the mixed setting. With the above protocol,
BA(κ) = O(n2κ).
I Remark. Our broadcast protocol guarantees no validity in case a fail-corrupted sender
crashes. This means that while the adversary can only prevent a fail-corrupted party from
sending messages, she can modify the messages broadcasted by such party. In this paper we
only consider such weak guarantees.
As a side remark, we note that an alternative solution would be to strengthen the
broadcast. This can be done by invoking after the weak broadcast our Heartbeat protocol
(defined in Section 5) on the sender. If Heartbeat succeeds (meaning that the sender is correct
at the end), then the value from the first broadcast can be used. Otherwise (the sender
crashed during or before Heartbeat), the broadcast fails and parties output ⊥.
9 In terms of [27], we require agreement and frangible validity. We do not consider strong validity in this
paper.
10All parties must know the current state of the protocol.
11The reason is that eliminated parties can still provide inputs to the MPC protocol.
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5 Player-Elimination Framework for the Mixed Setting
The player-elimination framework was introduced in [35] with the goal of designing efficient
actively secure multiparty protocols. The central idea is that every time the adversary
actively disrupts the protocol execution, at least one malicious party is “eliminated”, and
the disrupted part of the protocol is repeated.
The player-elimination framework reduces the problem of designing a resilient protocol to
the problem of designing a detectable protocol for the same task. In a nutshell, a detectable
protocol can give incorrect outputs, but only if this is noticed by at least one honest
party. Privacy needs to be preserved even if the adversary disrupts the protocol execution.
Since detectability is a much weaker requirement than resilience, detectable protocols for a
given task are usually much more efficient. The player-elimination framework transforms a
detectable protocol into a resilient one, essentially without complexity overhead.
A protocol executed within the player-elimination framework is evaluated in segments.
The size of a segment can be arbitrary, but it influences the overall complexity. For each
segment, four phases are executed: detectable computation, fault detection, fault localization
and player elimination. In the first phase the parties evaluate the segment, using the (very
efficient) detectable protocol. Then, in fault detection, they detect whether any of them
noticed a disruption in the first phase. If this is not the case, they proceed to the next
segment. Otherwise, in fault localization they localize a set of two disputing parties (that is,
two parties such that each of them claims that the other is corrupted). Both these parties
are eliminated in player elimination, and the current segment is repeated. The eliminated
parties no longer take part in the computation, but they can still provide inputs and receive
outputs.
Unfortunately, the player-elimination framework for the active setting [35] does not work
in the mixed setting. One reason is that a detectable protocol only guarantees that a fault
is noticed by a non-actively corrupted party. This means that if all parties who noticed it
crash right after the protocol, the fault may not be detected. Moreover, fault detection and
localization subprotocols for the active-only setting break down in the mixed setting. For
example, the localized set of disputing parties may contain a crashed and an honest party. If
such set was eliminated, the condition 3ta + 2tp + tf < n would no longer hold.
We therefore enhance the player-elimination framework to cope with mixed adversaries
as follows. First, we modify the notion of a detectable protocol. Roughly, if a party crashes
during (or before) the execution of a detectable protocol, then the output can be incorrect
even without a correct party noticing this. Accordingly, in fault detection the parties detect
not only whether a correct party noticed a disruption, but also whether a party crashed.
Then, in Fault Localization, two sets of parties are localized, such that unless a party in the
first set has crashed, at least one of the two parties in the second set is actively corrupted.
Afterwards, the protocol Heartbeat is invoked on each party in the first set, in order to
determine whether it crashed. Finally, in player elimination the parties eliminate either the
crashed parties in the first set or, if there are no such parties, all parties in the second set.
Protocol Convention
In the description of detectable protocols, we say that a (correct) party who notices a fault
becomes unhappy. Formally, each party stores a binary value, which we call a happy-bit,
and which can take values “happy” and “unhappy”. When a party becomes unhappy, it
sets its happy-bit to “unhappy”. The state of the happy-bits is local to each party, but it is
persistent between protocols. Furthermore, we adopt the convention that during a detectable
protocol, an unhappy party does not send any messages.
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Detectability in the Mixed Setting
We extend the definition of a detectable protocol of [35] to the mixed setting. Informally,
we require that a protocol may produce incorrect outputs, but only if this is noticed by a
correct party, or if any party crashed. Moreover, we require (1) completeness – a protocol
should give correct outputs if there are no faults during the execution and (2) privacy, which
must be preserved always, no matter if there were crashes or malicious behavior.
I Definition 2. A passively secure protocol Π for a set of parties P ′ is detectable if after
the execution of Π at least one of the following is true: either (1) the outputs of all correct
parties are correct, or (2) at least one correct party in P ′ is unhappy, or (3) at least one
fail-stop corrupted party in P ′ crashed. Moreover, if all parties are honest, then no (correct)
party becomes unhappy. Furthermore, Π guarantees privacy in all cases.
Fault Detection
The protocol FaultDetect is executed by the parties in P ′ during the phase of fault detection.
Its goal is to unify the happy-bits of the parties, such that all parties become unhappy
whenever any correct party is unhappy or any party crashed. We also require that FaultDetect
is complete, by which we mean that at the end of FaultDetect all correct parties are happy
whenever (1) all parties enter the protocol happy, (2) all parties behave according to the
protocol specification, and (3) all fail-corrupted parties finish FaultDetect alive. In particular,
this means that if conditions (1) and (2) are fulfilled, and no party crashed before FaultDetect,
but there was a crash during FaultDetect, we do not put any requirements on the final values
of the happy-bits, except that they are the same for all parties.
1: Every Pi ∈ P ′ sends its happy-bit to every other party and sets its happy-bit to “unhappy” if
from at least one party it does not receive a bit at all or if the bit it receives is “unhappy”
(or if it was unhappy before).
2: The parties in P ′ run consensus on their happy-bits.
3: Every Pi ∈ P ′ sets its happy-bit to the result of the consensus.
Protocol FaultDetect(P ′, t′a, t′p, t′f )
I Lemma 3. Assuming that 3t′a + t′f < n′, the protocol FaultDetect gives the following
guarantees:
(Consistency) At the end of FaultDetect the values of the happy-bits are the same for all
parties.
(Correctness) If any party starts FaultDetect being correct and unhappy, or if any party
starts FaultDetect crashed, then at the end all parties are unhappy.
(Completeness) If all parties are honest and start FaultDetect happy, then at the end all
parties are happy.
The communication complexity of FaultDetect is O(n2 + BA(1)).
Proof. Consistency follows by consistency of consensus. For correctness, note that both an
unhappy party and a party which starts FaultDetect crashed make every correct party set
its happy-bit to “unhappy” in Step 1. By persistence of consensus, every correct party is
unhappy at the end of FaultDetect. Finally, if there is no crashed party and no unhappy party
at the start of FaultDetect, and if all parties behave according to the protocol specification
and no party crashes, then the value of happy-bit at the beginning of consensus is “happy” for
all correct parties. By persistence, every correct party is happy at the end of the protocol. J
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Heartbeat
The protocol Heartbeat allows the parties in P ′ to reach agreement on whether a given party
Ph ∈ P ′ is alive. Formally, every party Pi ∈ P ′ outputs a binary value, equal to “alive” or
“crashed”.
1: Ph sends the value 1 to every party Pj ∈ P ′.
2: The parties invoke consensus, where the input of Pj is 1 if it received the value 1 from Ph
and 0 otherwise. The parties output “alive” if the output of the consensus is 1 and “crashed”
otherwise.
Protocol Heartbeat(Ph, (P ′, t′a, t′p, t′f ))
I Lemma 4. Assuming that 3t′a + t′f < n′, the protocol Heartbeat gives the following
guarantees:
(Consistency) All parties in P ′ output the same value “alive” or “crashed”.
(Correctness) If Ph starts Heartbeat crashed, then the output of Heartbeat is “crashed”.
(Completeness) If Ph finishes Heartbeat correct, then the output of Heartbeat is “alive”.
The communication complexity of Heartbeat is O(n+ BA(1)).
Proof. Consistency follows directly from consistency of consensus, while correctness and
completeness follow from persistence of consensus. J
6 Secret Sharing
We employ the Shamir secret sharing [44], where each party Pi has associated with it a
unique value αi ∈ F \ {0}. A value s ∈ F is correctly shared with degree d among the parties
in P if every correct party Pi ∈ P holds a value si ∈ F, such that all points (αi, si) lie
on a polynomial g of degree at most d with g(0) = s. A situation, in which s is d-shared
among P is called a d-sharing of s and denoted by [s]d. Sometimes we require a value to be
simultaneously d-shared and d′-shared. Such a sharing is called a (d, d′)-sharing of s and
denoted [s]d,d′ . The Shamir secret sharing is linear, that is, affine operations on shared values
can be performed directly on the respective shares, without any communication.
There are two protocols associated with a secret-sharing scheme: share and reconstruct.
In this paper, we do not consider the share protocol, and use instead a protocol that generates
sharings of random values (as explained in Section 7). On the other hand, we consider three
reconstruction protocols, the guarantees of which we describe below (the details are given in
the full version [37]). All reconstruction protocols take as input the sharing degree d and the
current configuration (P ′, t′a, t′p, t′f ).
The private reconstruction protocol RecPriv(Pr, d, (P ′, t′a, t′p, t′f ), [s]d) detectably recon-
structs the sharing [s]d towards Pr ∈ P, assuming that d′ < n− t′a and (P ′, t′a, t′p, t′f ) is
valid. The communication cost is O(n′κ).
The private reconstruction protocol RecPrivRobust(Pr, d, (P ′, t′a, t′p, t′f ), [s]d) robustly re-
constructs the sharing [s]d towards Pr ∈ P, assuming that d′ < n − 2t′a − t′f and
(P ′, t′a, t′p, t′f ) is valid. The communication cost is O(n′κ).
The public reconstruction RecPub(d, `, (P ′, t′a, t′p, t′f ), [s1]d , . . . , [s`]d) detectably recon-
structs ` sharings towards all parties in P ′, assuming d′ < n − t′a and (P ′, t′a, t′p, t′f ) is
valid. The communication cost is O(`n′κ+n′2κ). Technically, the protocol is a non-robust
version of the protocol of [22].
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7 Preparation Phase
Recall that the goal of the preparation phase is to robustly generate a number of multiplication
triples, as formally defined by FprepPhase. To realize FprepPhase, we proceed as follows. First,
we define an intermediate functionality Ftriples, which is essentially a non-robust version of
FprepPhase (it also includes fault localization) and realize FprepPhase in the Ftriples-hybrid model.
The rest of this section is then devoted to realizing Ftriples.
7.1 The Functionality FprepPhase
The parties input to the functionality the desired number L of triples and the current
configuration (P ′, t′a, t′p, t′f ). Since the protocol employs player elimination, the resulting
triples are shared among the parties in a smaller set P ′′. The resulting configuration
(P ′′, t′′a, t′′p , t′′f ) is outputted to all parties. Moreover, all parties in P ′′ receive the shares of L
triples, where the sharing degree is d = ta + tp. We model the worst-case scenario, where the
adversary is allowed to choose (P ′′, t′′a, t′′p , t′′f ), as long as it is valid and decides on the shares
of passively and actively corrupted parties.
The functionality receives sets of corrupted parties Pa,Pp,Pf . Let d = ta + tp.
1: Receive from each party a number L and a valid configuration (P ′, t′a, t′p, t′f ).
2: If these values (ignoring ⊥) are not consistent among parties, or if (P ′, t′a, t′p, t′f ) is not valid,
execute Complete Break Down. Else, send (Ok, L,P ′, t′a, t′p, t′f ) to the adversary and proceed
as follows.
3: The adversary sends:
A valid set P ′′ ⊆ P ′ with thresholds t′′a , t′′p , t′′f .
For each Pj ∈ (Pa ∪ Pp), shares ((a(k)j , b(k)j , c(k)j ))k=1...L.
(Set P ′′ = P ′, t′′x = t′x and (a(k)j , b(k)j , c(k)j ) = (0, 0, 0) if valid values are not received.)
4: Send (P ′′, t′′a , t′′p , t′′f ) to all parties.
5: Generate L triples shared among the parties in P ′′ as follows. For each triple k, choose
random a(k) and b(k), and let c(k) = a(k)b(k). Then, for each k = 1, . . . , L and x ∈ {a, b, c},
choose the polynomial g(k)x at random from the set of all polynomials of degree at most d,
going through the point (0, x(k)) and all points in {(αj , x(k)j ) | Pj ∈ (Pa ∪ Pp)}. Send to each
Pi ∈ P ′′ its shares (g(k)a (αi), g(k)b (αi), g(k)c (αi)).
Functionality FprepPhase
7.2 The Functionality Ftriples
On a high level, the functionality non-robustly generates a number of triples, and, in case of
failure, identifies a set containing a significant number of actively- or fail-corrupted parties.
The parties input to Ftriples the desired number of triples ` and the configuration
(P ′, t′a, t′p, t′f ). Then, the adversary decides on one of three outcomes: (1) The detectable
computation succeeds, and ` triples shared with degree d = ta + tp among the parties in P ′
are generated; (2) The adversary disrupted the protocol and a set containing an active party
is identified and outputted to all parties; (3) The adversary disrupted the protocol and a
set of fail-corrupted parties is outputted. In the latter two cases, the adversary chooses the
outputted set, but a sufficient fraction of parties in the set must be actually corrupted (if
this is not satisfied, the parties receive the shared triples).
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The functionality receives sets of corrupted parties Pa,Pp,Pf . Let d = ta + tp.
1: Receive from each party a number ` and a valid configuration (P ′, t′a, t′p, t′f ).
2: If these values (ignoring ⊥) are not consistent among parties, or if (P ′, t′a, t′p, t′f ) is not valid,
execute Complete Break Down. Else, send (Ok, `,P ′, t′a, t′p, t′f ) to the adversary and proceed
as follows.
3: Receive from the adversary a message M, which is processed as follows:
IfM = (Triples, ((a(k)j , b
(k)
j , c
(k)
j ))k=1...`,Pj∈(Pa∪Pp)), then generate ` triples shared among
the parties in P ′ as follows. For each triple k, choose random a(k) and b(k), and let
c(k) = a(k)b(k). Then, for each k = 1, . . . , ` and x ∈ {a, b, c}, choose the polynomial g(k)x
at random from the set of all polynomials of degree at most d, going through the point
(0, x(k)) and all points in {(αj , x(k)j ) | Pj ∈ (Pa ∪ Pp)}. Send to each Pi ∈ P ′ its shares
(g(k)a (αi), g(k)b (αi), g
(k)
c (αi)).
If M = (ActiveSet, E), where E ⊆ P ′ is a set such that |E ∩ Pa| ≥ |E|/2, then send
(ActiveSet, E) to the parties.
IfM = (CrashSet, E), where E ⊆ P ′, E ⊆ Pf ∪Pa and E 6= ∅, then send (CrashSet, E)
to the parties.
Any other message is treated as (Triples, ((0, 0, 0))k=1...`,Pj∈(Pa∪Pp)).
Functionality Ftriples
7.3 Realizing FprepPhase in the Ftriples-hybrid Model
We now present the protocol PreparationPhase that realizes FprepPhase in the Ftriples-hybrid
model. The protocol divides the L into ta + tf segments of length ` and sequentially calls
Ftriples with input `. It starts with P ′′ = P ′ and in case of a disruption, eliminates parties
from P ′′. The outputs of all parties is the resulting set P ′′ and, for parties in P ′′, the shares
of the triples.
Let ` = d L
ta+tf
e and d = ta + tp.
Set P ′′ = P ′, t′′a = t′a, t′′p = t′p and t′′f = t′f . For each segment k = 1 . . . (ta + tf ) do:
1: Send ` and (P ′′, t′′a , t′′p , t′′f ) to Ftriples.
2: If the output is (ActiveSet, E), set P ′′ = P ′′ \ E and t′′a = t′′a − |E|/2, and repeat Step 1.
3: Else if the output is (CrashSet, E), then set P ′′ = P ′′ \ E and t′′f = t′′f − |E|, and repeat
Step 1.
4: Else, store the sharings received from Ftriples and continue to the next segment.
Every Pi outputs the configuration (P ′′, t′′a , t′′p , t′′f ). Moreover, every Pi ∈ P ′′ outputs the first L
triples of shares received from Ftriples.
Protocol PreparationPhase (L, (P ′, t′a, t′p, t′f ))
I Theorem 5. Assuming that 3ta + 2tp + tf < n, the protocol PreparationPhase securely
realizes FprepPhase in the Ftriples-hybrid model, in the presence of a static mixed adversary.
Proof. The simulator SprepPhase only needs to simulate the interaction with the ideal func-
tionality Ftriples. This is done by simply executing the code of Ftriples.
Throughout the execution in the real world, we have the following invariant: (P ′′, t′′a, t′′p , t′′f )
is valid and the shares stored by parties in P ′′ form correct d-sharings of triples. The former
follows from the observation that n′′− 2t′′a − t′′f is preserved when parties are eliminated (this
is trivially guaranteed by Ftriples). This also implies that 3t′′a + 2t′′p + t′′f < n′′. For the latter,
notice that a d-sharing in P ′ is also a correct d-sharing in P ′′, since d is constant. The above
invariant shows that the outputs are the same in the real and in the ideal world. 12 J
12Observe that we do not need that in case Ftriples sends (CrashSet, E), the parties in E are actually not
correct. It is enough that they are in Pf .
M. Hirt and M. Mularczyk 3:15
7.4 Realizing Ftriples
We first construct two auxiliary protocols: The first protocol generates a number of double
sharings of random values, using hyper-invertible matrices. This double-sharing protocol
can then be used in the second protocol to detectably generate a number of multiplication
triples. The triple-generation protocol, together with fault detection and fault localization,
can be used to realize Ftriples.
Generating Double Sharings
The goal of the protocol DoubleShareRandom is to detectably generate a number of (d, d′)-
sharings of uniformly random values, unknown to the adversary, assuming that 3t′a+2t′p+t′f <
n′. The degrees d and d′ of the outputted sharings can be arbitrary.
We use the trivial protocol Share, which, on input a sharing degree d and a value s from
a party Pi, generates a (possibly inconsistent) d-sharing of s.
Pi chooses a random polynomial g of degree d and sends to every party Pj ∈ P ′ its share
sj = g(αj).
Protocol Share(Pi, d, s, (P ′, t′a, t′p, t′f ))
The protocol generates the (d, d′)-sharings in buckets of size at most n′ − 2t′a − t′p −
min(t′a, t′p). The idea is to, for each bucket, use Share to generate n′ double-sharings of random
values, each value chosen by a different party. Up to t′a of these sharings might be inconsistent
and up to t′a + t′p of them might be known to the adversary. Then, we apply to this vector of
sharings a (fixed) hyper-invertible matrix. First, this ensures that at least n′ − ta − tp of the
resulting sharings contain uniformly random values, unknown to the adversary. Moreover,
hyper-invertibility guarantees that if there exists a set of t′a resulting sharings which are
consistent, then all sharings are consistent. We exploit this fact by reconstructing 2t′a of the
resulting sharings, each towards a different party, who then checks the consistency of the
sharing it received. If no correct party notices an inconsistency, then all sharings must be
consistent. This verification step reveals to the adversary additional min(2t′a, t′a + t′p) shared
values, hence, only n′− ta− tp−min(2t′a, t′a + t′p) = n′− 2t′a− t′p−min(t′a, t′p) remain private.
To generate any number ` of double sharings, the procedure sketched above is invoked a
number of times (in parallel).
The ` sharings are generated in buckets of size n′− 2t′a− t′p−min(t′a, t′p) (with the last bucket
possibly smaller). Generate each bucket of size l using the following procedure:
1: Every party Pi ∈ P ′ chooses si at random and double-shares it among P ′ by invoking
Share(Pi, d, si, (P ′, t′a, t′p, t′f )) and Share(Pi, d′, si, (P ′, t′a, t′p, t′f )).
2: The parties compute locally ([r1]d,d′ , . . . , [rn′ ]d,d′)
T = M([s1]d,d′ , . . . , [sn′ ]d,d′)
T , using
the shares of s1, . . . , sn′ , where M is a fixed hyper-invertible matrix of size n′ × n′.
3: For every Pi ∈ P ′ and j ∈ {1, . . . , 2t′a}, Pi sends its shares of [rj ]d,d′ to Pj .
4: Every Pj with j ∈ {1, . . . , 2t′a} verifies that the values it got define a correct (d, d′)-
sharing, that is, that all shares of the d-sharing lie on a polynomial g of degree d, that
all shares of the d′-sharing lie on a polynomial g′ of degree d′, and that g(0) = g′(0).
If any of these conditions does not hold, Pj gets unhappy.
5: The l sharings generated in this bucket are [rn′−l+1]d,d′ , . . . , [rn′ ]d,d′ .
Output all sharings generated in all buckets (that is, ` sharings in total).
Protocol DoubleShareRandom(d, d′, `, (P ′, t′a, t′p, t′f ))
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The communication cost of DoubleShareRandom can be seen to be O(`n′κ+n′2κ). Hence,
for large enough `, the amortized complexity of generating one double-sharing is O(n′κ).
I Lemma 6. Assuming that (P ′, t′a, t′p, t′f ) is valid and the values inputted by the parties
are consistent, DoubleShareRandom detectably generates ` correct (d, d′)-sharings, where for
each sharing, the shared value is uniformly random given the view of the adversary. The
communication complexity of DoubleShareRandom is O(`n′κ+ n′2κ).
Proof. Consider one bucket, in which l (d, d′)-sharings are generated, where l ≤ n′ − 2t′a −
t′p −min(t′a, t′p).
Correctness: Assume that no crash occurred and that after the protocol all correct
parties are happy. All values si generated by the correct parties in Step 1 are double-shared
correctly. Thus, at least n′ − t′a sharings [si]d,d′ are correct. Moreover, at least t′a out of 2t′a
sharings [ri]d,d′ verified in Step 4 are verified by correct parties and, thus, must be correct (as
otherwise a correct party would become unhappy). Together, this gives n′ correct sharings.
Since M is hyper-invertible, any other sharing can be written as an affine combination of
these correct sharings. Any affine combination of correct (d, d′)-sharings is also a correct
(d, d′)-sharing, hence all involved sharings are correct.
Secrecy: The values known to the adversary are at most: t′a + t′p values si (those chosen
by passively or actively corrupted parties) and min(2t′a, t′a + t′p) = t′a + min(t′a, t′p) values
ri (those possibly revealed to such parties). With these 2t′a + t′p + min(t′a, t′p) values fixed,
there is a bijective mapping between the actual l ≤ n′− 2t′a− t′p−min(t′a, t′p) values ri whose
sharings are generated by the protocol and any other l values si, generated by honest or only
fail-stop corrupted parties. Therefore, the values contained in the generated sharings are
uniform random and independent of the view of the adversary.
Completeness: If all parties behave according to the protocol, correctness of Double-
ShareRandom is trivial and security follows from the above argument.
Complexity: In each bucket the parties communicate O(n′2κ) bits, which follows by
inspection of the protocol. Moreover, each bucket (but the last one) contains n′ − 2t′a − t′p −
min(t′a, t′p) double-sharings, which can be seen to be at least 15n′ 13, hence, there are at most
5`/n′ + 1 buckets. Therefore, the overall communication complexity of DoubleShareRandom
is O((5`/n′ + 1)n′2κ) = O(`n′κ+ n′2κ). J
Detectably Generating Multiplication Triples
The goal of the protocol GenerateTriples is to detectably generate a number of random
multiplication triples, shared in an arbitrary degree d, assuming that 3t′a + 2t′p + t′f < n′.
The idea is that GenerateTriples invokes DoubleShareRandom, in order to generate random
double-sharings [ai]d,d′ , [bi]d,d′ and [ri]d,2d′ , where d′ = t′a + t′p. The parties then use the
d′-sharings of ai and bi, and the 2d′-sharings of ri to locally compute 2d′-sharings of the
blinded products ei = aibi − ri as [ei]2d′ = [ai]d′ [bi]d′ − [ri]2d′ . These blinded products are
then publicly reconstructed using RecPub and the d-sharings of the products ci are computed
as [ci]d = [ri]d + ei, using the d-sharings of ri.
13 If we set m = 3t′a + 2t′p, then t′a ≥ m/5 or t′p ≥ m/5. It follows that n′ − 2t′a − t′p − min(t′a, t′p) =
n′ −m+ t′a + t′p −min(t′a, t′p) = n′ −m+ max(t′a, t′p) + min(t′a, t′p)−min(t′a, t′p) ≥ n′/5.
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1: The parties invoke DoubleShareRandom(d, d′, 2`, (P ′, t′a, t′p, t′f )) and
DoubleShareRandom(d, 2d′, `, (P ′, t′a, t′p, t′f )), where d′ = t′a + t′p, to generate random double
sharings [a1]d,d′ , . . . , [a`]d,d′ , [b1]d,d′ , . . . , [b`]d,d′ and [r1]d,2d′ , . . . , [r`]d,2d′ .
2: For i ∈ {1, . . . , `}, the parties compute locally a 2d′-sharing of ei = aibi − ri as [ci]2d′ =
[ai]d′ [bi]d′ − [ri]2d′ .
3: The parties invoke RecPub(2d′, `, (P ′, t′a, t′p, t′f ), [e1]2d′ , . . . , [e`]2d′).
4: For i ∈ {1, . . . , `}, the parties compute locally a d-sharing of ci = aibi as [ci]d = [ri]d + ei.
5: Output the ` triples ([a1]d , [b1]d , [c1]d), . . . , ([a`]d , [b`]d , [c`]d).
Protocol GenerateTriples(d, `, (P ′, t′a, t′p, t′f ))
I Lemma 7. Assuming that (P ′, t′a, t′p, t′f ) is valid and the values inputted by the parties are
consistent, GenerateTriples detectably generates ` triples of sharings, where each sharing is a
correct d-sharing, and for each triple ([a]d , [b]d , [c]d), the shared values a and b are uniformly
random given the view of the adversary, and c = ab. The communication complexity of
GenerateTriples is O(`n′κ+ n′2κ).
Proof. Since 3t′a + 2t′p + t′f < n′, we get that the degree 2d′ of the sharings used in Step 3
fulfills 2d′ = 2t′a + 2t′p < n′ − t′a. Hence, correctness and secrecy of outputted triples follow
from the correctness of RecPub and 6. The complexity follows by inspection. J
Realizing Ftriples
The following protocol Triples realizes Ftriples.
1: Every party in P ′ sets its happy-bit to “happy”.
. Detectable Computation
2: The parties invoke GenerateTriples(d, `, (P ′, t′a, t′p, t′f )) for d = ta + tp.
. Fault Detection
3: The parties invoke FaultDetect. If, as a result, they are all happy, they output the generated
triples. Otherwise, they do the following.
. Fault Localization
4: Let Pr be the party with the smallest index in P ′. Every Pi ∈ P ′ sends to Pr the randomness
Ri it used in the two previous steps and the messages Mi it received in those steps. If Pr
does not receive values from some parties, it uses instead the default values and proceeds.14
5: For each Pi, Pr reproduces all messages that Pi should have sent, using Ri and Mi, and, for
each Pj , compares them with the messages Pj claims to have received from Pi (as specified
in Mj). Then, Pr broadcasts a tuple (l, Pi, Pj , x, x′), such that the lth message Pj claims
to have received from Pi was x′, while according to Pi it should have been x.
6: Pi broadcasts whether it agrees with Pr (i.e., whether the lth message it sent to Pj was x).
Pj broadcasts whether it agrees with Pr (i.e., whether if the lth message it received from
Pi was x′).
7: If Pi disagrees, every party sets E = {Pi, Pr}. If Pj disagrees, every party sets E = {Pj , Pr}.
Otherwise, every party sets E = {Pi, Pj}.
8: For every Ph ∈ {Pi, Pj , Pr}, the parties in P ′ invoke Heartbeat(Ph).
9: If the output of every invocation of Heartbeat is “alive”, output E. Otherwise, output the set
of parties, for whom the output of Heartbeat was “crashed”.
Protocol Triples (`, (P ′, t′a, t′p, t′f ))
14 If Pr does not get the values from some party Pi, it could, instead of ignoring it, broadcast the index of
such party. However, such solution would make the description of the protocol more involved.
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I Theorem 8. Assuming that 3ta + 2tp + tf < n, the protocol Triples securely evaluates
Ftriples in the presence of a static mixed adversary.
Proof. We present the simulator Striples. Roughly, since there are no private inputs to the
protocol (only private outputs), Striples simulates the execution towards the adversary A
by executing the protocol. The key point is to make sure that the outputs are distributed
correctly.
The simulator has black-box access to the adversary A. It outputs whatever A outputs.
1: Receive (Ok, `,P ′, t′a, t′p, t′f ) from Ftriples.
2: Execute GenerateTriples(d, `, (P ′, t′a, t′p, t′f )) and FaultDetect on behalf of the correct parties
in P ′ \ Pa: in each round, send the messages generated by the protocol to A, receive the
messages from corrupted parties and information about crashes, and compute the next
messages accordingly.
3: If the parties do not agree on the output of FaultDetect, abort.
4: Otherwise, if this output is “happy”, do as follows: For each triple k = 1 . . . `, compute
the shares of the corrupted parties in P ′ that would result from the protocol (this is fully
determined by the exchanged messages) and choose random shares for the corrupted parties
not in P ′. Send these shares, together with the command Triples, to Ftriples.
5: Otherwise (i.e., the output is “unhappy”), continue by executing fault localization. If
the correct parties do not agree on the resulting set E, abort. Otherwise, send to Ftriples
(ActiveSet, E) or (CrashSet, E), depending on the result of fault localization.
Simulator Striples
Assume that the honest parties input consistent values `, P ′, t′a, t′p and t′f , and that the
set P ′ is valid (otherwise, the simulation is trivial). This means that the preconditions for
Lemmas 3, 4 and 7 are met. By consistency of FaultDetect (Lemma 3), Striples does not abort
in Step 3. Then, Striples sends the command Triples if and only if the result of FaultDetect
is “happy”, which is the same as in the real world. Hence, we can consider two cases: (1) the
simulator sends Triples, and (2) he sends ActiveSet or CrashSet.
Case Triples. Consider any triple and the corresponding sharing polynomials ga, gb and
gc. In the real world, by correctness of FaultDetect, no party is crashed and no correct
party is unhappy at the end of GenerateTriples. Therefore, the secrecy stated in Lemma 7
guarantees that the free coefficients a and b of ga and gb are uniformly random and
independent of the view of the adversary. Moreover, correctness stated in Lemma 7
guarantees that the free coefficient of gc is c = ab. Therefore, the free coefficients are
distributed identically as in the ideal world.
By correctness (Lemma 7), the degree of all polynomials is at most d. It is easy to see
that in both worlds the polynomials are uniformly random among those consistent with
the shares that would be outputted by the corrupted parties and with the free coefficients
distributed as above.
Case ActiveSet or CrashSet. In this case it is enough to argue correctness (note that here
the parties have no secret inputs and the ideal functionality is deterministic). The set E
sent by Striples is the same as in the protocol.
The simulator sends CrashSet if and only if the output of Heartbeat for some parties in
P ′ was not “alive”. In this case, E contains no correct party, by completeness of Heartbeat
(Lemma 4).
Now consider the other case, where Striples sends ActiveSet. By correctness of Heartbeat,
none of Pi, Pj and Pk was crashed at the end of Step 7. It follows that if in Step 4 Pr
received no messages from Pi (or Pj), then Pi (or Pj) is malicious and could have sent the
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default values taken by Pr anyway. Consider how the set E is chosen in Step 7. If Pi (or Pj)
disagrees, then clearly it makes a conflicting claim with Pr. On the other hand, if none of Pi
and Pj disagrees with Pr, then one of Pi and Pj must be malicious, because they disagree
on the message sent from Pi to Pj . Hence, E contains two parties making conflicting claims.
One of these parties must be actively corrupted. J
7.5 Complexity
Consider first the complexity of the protocol Triples. By Lemmas 7 and 3, executing
GenerateTriples and FaultDetect requires communicating O(`nκ+n2κ+BA(1)) bits. For the
complexity of fault localization, observe that the total number of bits needed to send the
messages Mi is exactly the communication complexity of GenerateTriples and FaultDetect,
and that, asymptotically, sending the values Ri does not add to this complexity. Together
with broadcasts and Heartbeat, this results in O(`nκ + n2κ + BA(κ)) bits for the whole
protocol Triples.
For the final protocol PreparationPhase, notice that the adversary can make the parties
repeat a segment at most ta + tf times. This means that Triples is executed at most
2(ta + tf ) times. Hence, the protcol PreparationPhase communicates PreparationPhase is
O(Lnκ+ (ta + tf )(n2κ+ BA(κ))), which amounts to O(Lnκ+ n3κ).
8 Evaluating Any Circuit
In the full version of this paper [37] we show how to use the preprocessing functionality
constructed in the previous section to evaluate any circuit. In order to do so, we first define a
multiplication functionality Fmult, which can be used to evaluate a number of multiplication
gates on the same depth. Fmult expects as input a number of shared multiplication triples.
We then construct a protocol that realizes the circuit-evaluation functionality Fmpc in
the (FprepPhase,Fmult)-hybrid model. Finally, we show how to realize Fmult, using circuit
randomization, the detectable public reconstruction protocol RecPub and player elimination.
The final result is the following functionality Fmpc. We note that since the adversary
can always prevent fail-corrupted parties from giving input, Fmpc is defined on an extended
input domain, where a party can input ⊥, meaning that it gives no input. Fmpc replaces the
inputs ⊥ by default inputs 0 and sends to all parties the set of all parties who inputted ⊥
(this way, parties know what circuit was actually evaluated).
1: Receive from each party a circuit C with a topological order on the gates and the party’s
inputs to C. (Execute Complete Break Down if different values C are received, or if C cannot
be evaluated.)
2: For each party whose input was ⊥, set all inputs to C to 0.
3: Evaluate C and send outputs to the corresponding parties. Send to all parties the set of
parties who inputted ⊥.
Functionality Fmpc
9 Conclusions
In this paper we present a perfectly-secure protocol which allows to securely evaluate
any circuit in the presence of a mixed adversary. Our protocol has linear communication
complexity per multiplication gate. Furthermore, our protocol is secure as long as 3ta +
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2tp + tf < n, which is optimal. Previous results for specific types of corruption can be seen
special cases of our result: we immediately get a linear protocol for the active setting (with
tp = tf = 0 and 3ta < n), a linear protocol for the passive setting (with ta = tf = 0 and
2tp < n) and a linear protocol for a fail-stop adversary (for tf < n). Moreover, our result is
much more general and implies protocols with linear complexity for any combination of these
settings. For example, we achieve a protocol, where overall 2/3 of the parties are corrupted.
Furthermore, we present a precise, simulation-based proof of security. As a special
case, this also yields the first actively-secure protocol with linear complexity and a sound
simulation-based proof (note the the proof in [8] is property-based).
Universal Composition
Katz et el. [41] formalize synchronous computation with secure channels and guaranteed
termination in the UC framework [13] and prove that any protocol that realizes a functionality
F in the stand-alone model and has a straightline black-box simulator, immediately yields a
protocol (with one additional synchronization round) that UC-realizes F. We note that they
consider the active-only setting, so their result cannot be readily applied to our protocol
for the mixed setting. However, we believe that with minor extensions, a similar result can
be phrased for our formulation of the mixed setting. We remark that we chose to use the
stand-alone model, since it naturally models the setting of synchronous computation over
secure channels, which results in simpler proofs. The communication in the UC framework,
on the other hand, is asynchronous and over insecure channels. Hence, to prove our protocol
secure in the UC framework, we would need techniques similar to those of [41], where the
authors use the hybrid model with clock and secure channels functionalities.
Future Work
An interesting direction for future work is to consider efficient protocols tolerating a mixed
adversary in the cryptographic and in the statistically-secure setting (hence, with larger
thresholds). Another important problem is to construct a protocol for the mixed setting,
that does not have the additive factor D · p(n) in the communication complexity. This can
potentially be achieved by combining our techniques with those of [33].
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